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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Comment on Recent Decisions
AUTOMOBILES--EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH REGISTRATION STAT-
uTE.-Plaintiff claimed an automobile attached as another's property, and
was allowed to show except as against innocent third parties that his ven-
dor was the true owner, although not holding under a bill of sale from
the former owner as required by the statute respecting the registration
and sale of automobiles. Moore et al. v. Wilson (Ky. 1929) 18 S. W. (2d)
873.
The purchase of an automobile in total disregard of a statute governing
the sale and transfer of such property is void and affords the purchaser no
defense in a replevin suit instituted by the plaintiff having a lawful claim
to the property. Hammond Motor Co. v. Warren (1923) 133 Kan. 44, 213
Pac. 810. It has been held that one who buys an automobile from a person
other than a regular dealer having an established place of business, not
complying with statutes as to such transfers has no insurable interest
against the theft of the automobile, although the statute did not expressly
declare the sale void, it having been passed to protect the public against
fraud, and to facilitate the recovery of stolen automobiles as well as to
prevent theft. Morris v. Firemen's Ins. Co. (1926) 121 Kan. 482, 247 Pac.
852. And where the buyer of an auto under a Missouri contract failed to
comply with R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 7651, requiring indorsement and transfer
of the registration certificate, and the seller collected from the defendant
insurer for the stolen car, assigning his title to the insurer, the latter, in
replevin by the buyer, could invoke the Missouri statutory provision making
void sales in violation thereof. Miller v. Colonial Underwriters' Ins. Co.
(1924) 117 Kan. 240, 230 Pac. 1030; State ex rel. Connecticut Fire Ins. Go.
v. Cox (1924) 306 Mo. 537, 268 S. W. 87; Muzenich v. MeCain (Mo. A.
1925) 274 S. W. 888. The Missouri registry statute expressly provides
that a failure to comply with its provisions will render the sale fraudulent
and void. In Aratzky v. Kropnitzsky (1923) 98 N. J. L. 344, 120 Atl. 921,
where there had been a sale without an assignment of the bill of sale, and
the vendor was suing to obtain payment of a check given as part of the
purchase price, the court said, "If the courts should undertake to enforce
contracts made in such violation of the terms of the statute they would be
aiding therein and encouraging the very mischief that the act was passed
to prevent."
But in Hennessy v. Automobile Owners' Ins. Ass'n (Tex. 1926) 282 S. W.
791, it was held that a provision in a statute passed to prevent the theft
of motor vehicles, making it unlawful under penalty to sell a second-hand
car without the transfer of the license fee receipt and the giving of a bill
of sale, does not render a sale without so doing void, so as to vest no in-
surable interest in the buyer. And in King v. Cline (1920) 49 Cal. App.
696, 194 Pac. 290, it was held that an assignment by the conditional vendor
of an automobile was not invalid for failure to comply with the statute as
to registration. See also Swank v. Mosian (1917) 85 Ore. 662, 166 Pac.
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962. Such statutes are a police regulation to protect the general public
from fraud and imposition, and the theft of motor vehicles. Carolina Dis-
count Corp. v. Landes' Motor Co. (1925) 190 N. C. 157, 129 S. E. 414;
Williams v. Stringfield et al. (1925) 76 Colo. 696, 231 Pac. 658. The stat-
utes in these jurisdictions provide for liability under the penal provisions,
but not that failure to comply with the provisions would render the sale
void.
The theft of motor vehicles has no relation to sales and transfers, and a
statute passed as a measure against fraud and theft should not be con-
strued as rendering contracts unenforceable. Neither compliance nor non-
compliance with the terms of a registration statute should be regarded as
conclusive of title. E. S., '31.
CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW-INTERNAL RLTmruE-GiFr TAX NOT INVALID AS
DIRECT TAX UNAPFO1TION.-Plaintff sued to recover a tax alleged to
have been illegally exacted upon gifts made by him after the passage of
the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 253, 313, as amended by sec. 324 (a) of
the Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 86, 26 U. S. C. A. 1131, providing for a
tax on gifts inter vivos not made in contemplation of death. Held, not in-
valid under U. S. Const. Art. 1, sec. 2, par. 3 and Art. 1, sec. 9, par. 4, as im-
posing a direct tax not apportioned, since such tax was but an excise or
impost applicable only to a limited exercise of property rights. Bromley
v. McCaughn (1929) 50 S. Ct. 46.
Art. 1, sec. 8 of the Constitution authorizing the levy and collection of
taxes and requiring uniformity throughout the country is limited by see. 2
of the same article which requires that "direct" taxes be apportioned, and
by sec. 9 which provides that "no capitation or direct tax shall be laid, un-
less in proportion to the census." It has been consistently held that a tax
laid upon a particular use of property incidental to ownership is an excise,
and therefore need not be apportioned. Hylton v. United States (U. S.
1796) 3 Dall. 171; Nicol v. Ames (1898) 173 U. S. 509; MeCray v. United
States (1903) 195 U. S. 27; Knowlton v. Moore (1899) 178 U. S. 41.
The statute in question imposes a graduated tax upon the exercise of
the power to give property inter vivos. In Knowlton v. Moore, above, it was
held that a graduated tax on legacies does not violate the Constitution.
Accord: Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co. (1915) 240 U. S. 1; Steb-
bins v. Riley (1924) 268 U. S. 137.
The tax in question is levied only upon the power to give the property.
There is no logical distinction between this tax and the one on the dispo-
sition of property by legacy upheld in Knowlton v. Moore, above; the tax
upon the manufacture and sale of colored oleomargarine sustained in Me-
Cray v. United States, above; or the tax upon the sale of grain upon an
exchange held valid in Nicol v. Ames, above. A recognized distinction ex-
ists between a tax imposed upon the exercise of a single one of those
powers incident to ownership and a tax levied upon the owner of property
regardless of the use made of the property. Billings v. United States
(1913) 232 U. S. 261. The reason for the distinction lies first in the fact
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